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Abstract
Formal correctness of complex multi-party network proto-
cols can be difficult to verify. While models of specific
fixed compositions of agents can be checked against de-
sign constraints, protocols which lend themselves to ar-
bitrarily many compositions of agents–such as the chain-
ing of proxies or the peering of routers–are more diffi-
cult to verify because they represent potentially infinite
state spaces and may exhibit emergent behaviors which
may not materialize under particular fixed compositions.
We address this challenge by developing an algebraic ap-
proach that enables us to reduce arbitrary compositions
of network agents into a behaviorally-equivalent (with re-
spect to some correctness property) compact, canonical
representation, which is amenable to mechanical verifica-
tion. Our approach consists of an algebra and a set of
property-preserving rewrite rules for the Canonical Homo-
morphic Abstraction of Infinite Network protocol composi-
tions (CHAIN). Using CHAIN, an expression over our alge-
bra (i.e., a set of configurations of network protocol agents)
can be reduced to another behaviorally-equivalent expres-
sion (i.e., a smaller set of configurations). Repeated appli-
cations of such rewrite rules produces a canonical expres-
sion which can be checked mechanically. We demonstrate
our approach by characterizing deadlock-prone configura-
tions of HTTP agents, as well as establishing useful prop-
erties of an overlay protocol for scheduling MPEG frames,
and of a protocol for Web intra-cache consistency.
1 Introduction
Increasingly, the Internet is being used as a ubiquitous in-
frastructure supporting a multitude of distributed applica-
tions and services. Unfortunately, the introduction (deploy-
ment and versioning) of Internet services is laden with un-
certainties that arise from our inability to formally estab-
lish the safety of such services—namely, that such services
will not interfere with existing services, or even with older
versions of the same service.1 In light of the critical role
that Internet services play in today’s economy and soci-
ety, it is incumbent on the networking community to de-
velop sound formalisms for (and promote the use of such
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1The Web community’s experiences in relationship to the evolution of
HTTP–as well as other findings we present in this paper—underscore this
state of affairs.
formalisms in) supporting/enforcing software engineering
practices for distributed applications deployed over the In-
ternet. Indeed, in a recent NSF PI meeting of over 250
network researchers, improving the trustworthiness of In-
ternet applications [27] and the development of formalisms
to scale our understanding of networked systems [26] were
deemed to be (two of) the most pressing challenges facing
the networking community for the next few years.
Current efforts to formally establish (or assess) the
“trustworthiness” of the Internet have focused on prov-
ing desirable properties2 of an individual protocol or ser-
vice agent [10], with very few efforts focusing on prop-
erties that emerge from the composition of such protocols
and services (see [14] for one recent example). Proper-
ties that emerge from the composition of network pro-
tocols are much harder to reason about—not to mention
check mechanically—due to the arbitrary nature of such
compositions, which is made even more challenging when
we consider issues of scalability and variant protocol im-
plementations. We motivate this with a concrete example
drawn from the networking community’s experience with
the HTTP protocol.
HTTP Protocol Compositions: Stateful multi-party
protocols can be notoriously difficult to get right, and their
design and implementation is a process demanding careful
thought. The evolution of the HTTP protocol is a case in
point. While the original formulations of the HTTP pro-
tocol were truly stateless and thus relatively easy to im-
plement, the addition of the multi-stage 100 Continue
mechanism to HTTP/1.1 [19] implicitly introduced several
“states” to the behavior of clients, servers, and interme-
diaries. Not surprisingly, an ambiguity was discovered in
the handling of these states with respect to intermediaries
which could, under some “correct” interpretations, lead to
a deadlock state among conforming implementations of
HTTP/1.1 (RFC2068) and HTTP/1.0 (RFC1945) [24].
For years, analogous problems have been commonplace
in the design of lower-level distributed protocols; master-
ing all the nuances of handshaking, rendezvous, mutual
exclusion, leader election, and flow control in such a way
as to guarantee correct, deadlock-free, work-accomplishing
behavior requires very careful thought, and hardening the
specifications and implementations of these protocols to
deal with misbehaving or potentially hostile peers remains
2These range from safety properties (e.g., absence of deadlocks, buffer
overruns) to security properties (e.g., authentication, privacy) to compli-
ance properties (e.g., TCP friendliness).
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a difficult problem for engineers at all layers of the stack.
These problems arise in such settings even without the
complexities of multi-version interoperability placed upon
HTTP/1.1 and its revisions.
In this paper we show how to use an algebraic ap-
proach coupled with a model-checking engine to systemat-
ically3 discover unsafe behaviors of arbitrary compositions
of HTTP agents, including fully characterizing deadlock
conditions we previously uncovered [5]. We also show how
this same approach generalizes to the verification of other
network protocols, including an overlay network protocol
for scheduling of MPEG frames and a Web intra-cache con-
sistency protocol.
Paper Contributions and Overview: This paper pro-
poses a systematic approach to the verification of safety
properties in arbitrary compositions of network proto-
cols using CHAIN–an algebra and associated rewrite rules
for the Canonical Homomorphic Abstraction of Infinite
Network protocol compositions. We instantiate our ap-
proach for a number of network protocols—showing how
it enables us to identify safety violations of arbitrarily
large compositions of these protocols mechanically, using
readily-available model checking technologies.
Using CHAIN, the composition (i.e., chaining) of net-
work protocol agents is represented symbolically using
strings (or chains), whereby each chain represents a possi-
ble “path” through (or arrangement of) the subset of agents
that comprise the composition. Arbitrary compositions of
a set of network protocols4 are likely to result in a large
(possibly infinite) number of such paths. Thus, such ar-
bitrary compositions can be algebraically represented us-
ing a possibly infinite set of chains (each for a given path
through the set of agents). To prove that a particular prop-
erty holds for such arbitrary compositions requires us to
verify that it holds for every chain in that set. To make
this process practical, we develop a set of rewriting rules
over the CHAIN algebra. These rewriting rules preserve the
property under consideration. By repeatedly applying these
rewriting rules, we effectively reduce the set of chains rep-
resenting arbitrary compositions to a canonical (minimal,
much smaller) set of chains—an abstraction of the original
set. This abstraction is a homomorphic image of the origi-
nal set in the sense that if a property holds for the abstrac-
tion, then it provably holds for any of the possibly infinite
compositions (or arrangements) of the network protocols.
Where the homomorphic image is of finite size, the com-
plete abstraction can then be verified mechanically using
off-the-shelf model-checking tools.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. As
a motivation for (and a case study for the application of)
our methodology, we begin in Section 2 by presenting the
3
“Systematically” does not necessarily mean “automatically”. Rather,
it means “methodically”, or subject to a prescribed process.
4When we refer to “composition of network protocols”, we are refer-
ring to the composition of multiple agents speaking a particular protocol
(i.e., composition of a protocol with itself), not the layering of distinct
protocols within a single agent or communication channel.
HTTP request continuation mechanism, a feature of the
HTTP/1.1 protocol. We follow that in Section 3 with a pre-
sentation of the underpinnings of our CHAIN algebra and
reductions. In Section 4 we bring the formalisms in CHAIN
to bear on three examples of protocol compositions. First,
we use it to characterize possible safety violations (dead-
lock scenarios) of HTTP/1.1 protocol compositions. We do
so by translating previously established “equivalence” rela-
tionships into algebraic rewrite rules, thus creating a finite
homomorphic image of the infinite set of HTTP composi-
tions, allowing us to exhaustively identify the infinite sets
of deadlock-prone and deadlock-safe compositions. Next,
we illustrate the application of CHAIN to two additional
network protocol composition problems: an MPEG packet
routing protocol for overlay networks, and a protocol for
ensuring web intra-cache consistency. We conclude the pa-
per in Section 6 with a summary and a brief discussion of
future directions of this work.
2 HTTP Request Continuation
In HTTP/1.0, all transactions had a very simple and state-
less communication model: (1) A client would send a
whole request, i.e., a request line, a set of headers, and
an optional request entity; (2) The server, after receiving
the whole request, would respond with a complete request,
i.e., a status line, a set of headers, and an optional response
entity.
One of the desired features for HTTP/1.1 was the abil-
ity for clients to avoid transmitting very large entities
with their requests when the transaction will fail indepen-
dent of the content of the document (e.g., an authentica-
tion failure or a temporary server condition) [19]. Con-
ceptually, this mirrors conditional operations (such as the
If-Modified-Since header) which allow a response
entity to be suppressed if its transmission is unnecessary.
The original HTTP/1.1 specification, RFC2068, supports
this capability by allowing clients to pause before sending
request entities; the server may send an error code immedi-
ately, informing the client that the request has already failed
and the request entity should not be sent, or may send a
100 Continue response, which tells the client to send
the request entity (although it does not guarantee that the
final response will not still be an error condition).
While the original specification of this mechanism (the
100 Continue response header [12, §8.2 and §10.1.1])
was clearly sound with respect to simple client-server
cases, it was ambiguous as to the correct behavior of prox-
ies; compelling arguments were made that the RFC’s lan-
guage suggested both hop-by-hop and end-to-end interpre-
tations of the feature. It was realized that, under at least
one of these interpretations, certain combinations of cor-
rectly implemented components in the client-proxy-server
chain were prone to deadlock [24]; an attempt at address-
ing this problem was made in the next public revision
(RFC2616) with the introduction of the Expect mecha-
nism [13, §8.2.3] and the clarification of the semantics
of 100 Continue [13, §10.1.1] with respect to prox-
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ies. Given that many existing implementations conformed
to the various interpretations of RFC2068, it was decided
that RFC2616 should also include a number of heuristics
to facilitate graceful interoperation with those implementa-
tions. The resulting quagmire of special-case interoperabil-
ity rules and the set of possible combinations of revisions
in the various roles makes it difficult to say anything with
certainty about the correctness and full interoperability of
the specification; while it seemed reasonably (and even em-
pirically) to be correct, it was not provably so.
2.1 Model Checking of HTTP Agents
In previous work [5], we presented a set of such models
for HTTP clients, proxies, and servers, and discussed ex-
periments with particular configurations. Any single com-
bination of a client, some proxies, and a server (hereafter
an arrangement) can be examined using a finite-state mod-
eling tool like SPIN [16] which instantiates and joins the
models with message channels and determines whether any
possible execution of that arrangement can lead to an unde-
sirable state (e.g., deadlock, livelock, assertion violation).
To prove the correctness of HTTP/1.1 (RFC2616), we
need for all client-server and client-proxies-server arrange-
ments of RFC2616 agents to be verified mechanically. The
client-server case is straightforward because it consists of
a single arrangement. However, in order to say something
concrete regarding situations in which there may be arbi-
trarily many proxies between the client and the server, such
an approach is clearly inappropriate, as it would demand
verification of an infinite number of arrangements using the
model checker (one for each possible length of the proxy
chain). Convincing ourselves of the interoperability prop-
erty is a similar process; for a client-proxy-server architec-
ture like HTTP, a brute-force approach requires us to verify
as many as
|C| × |S| ×
( ∞∑
i=0
|P|i
)
arrangements, where C is the set of client models, P is the
set of proxy models, and S is the set of server models. Us-
ing this brute-force approach, not only would a “complete”
proof require verifying an infinite number of arrangements,
but even a “partial” proof (all cases up to N proxies) re-
quires verifying a number of arrangements exponential in
N .
We have previously established that particular arrange-
ments are provably equivalent (in terms of their cause-
effect behaviors) to other arrangements [5]. With a suf-
ficient set of such “behavioral equivalence” relationships,
one could potentially reduce an arbitrarily large set of ar-
rangements to a much smaller (preferably finite) set of be-
haviorally representative arrangements, which could then
each be verified. To be useful, the discovery and applica-
tion of such reductions must follow a systematic approach.
Much work has already been done in several communi-
ties on discovery of such relationships (e.g., [7, 2, 22]);
in the remainder of this paper, we presume such results
and develop a reduction strategy based upon an algebraic
term rewriting technique that is immediately applicable to
a wide range of network application structures. 5
It is important to note that a number of techniques have
been developed in the literature for checking models with
infinite state spaces (e.g., [17, 9, 21, 8, 20]). These tech-
niques tend (in their current state) to be fairly opaque in
the sense that they often cannot connect their abstraction of
the infinite state space with intuitively useful declarations
about the behavior of particular protocol agents. 6 For de-
signing and testing distributed protocols, we believe that
the ability to do so is crucially important not only for pur-
poses of comprehension (i.e., how to “visualize” the infinite
state space spanned by an arbitrary arrangement), but also
for purposes of tracing back causes of unsafe emergent be-
haviors to specific culprits (e.g., for debugging purposes). 7
3 The CHAIN Approach
In this section we present the details of our algebraic ap-
proach, CHAIN (a system for the Canonical Homomorphic
Abstraction of Infinite Network protocol compositions). In-
tuitively, CHAIN represents protocol compositions using
strings; the infinite set of such strings is reduced to a char-
acteristic finite set via reduction relations (rewrite rules)
which preserve a correctness property. This section dis-
cusses the formal structure and properties of these com-
ponents which give rise to the desirable properties of a
CHAIN system (correct abstraction, sufficient expressive
power, homomorphism, termination, canonicity of result).
3.1 Arrangements in CHAIN
Let G = (N , E) be a graph where the members of N de-
note agents which will make up our models and E are di-
rected edges which indicate valid sequences of those agents
(that is, if there is an edge from node n1 to n2, then n2 may
immediately follow n1 in a composition). The set of chains
in G is then simply the set of finite paths in G, which we
denote paths(G).
For the HTTP protocol,G will look like Figure 1. Notice
that our definition of chains includes sequences which will
make up “partial” network setups, e.g., client connected
with a series of proxies (but no server) or even an empty
5While this paper will focus upon linear compositions of agents,
CHAIN also generalizes to more interesting structures such as trees and
digraphs.
6Many techniques employ a notion of “equivalence classes” [17, 20],
these are generally classes within an abstract internal state representation
which do not necessarily translate to intuitively useful insights about the
structure of the application or system itself.
7The above statement should not be taken to imply that model check-
ing is not a useful verification tool. On the contrary, we actually use model
checking to verify the canonical representations we derive through our al-
gebraic approach. Rather, our position is that the state space explosion
that model checkers must subdue should not be compounded by the ex-
plosion resulting from the representation of arbitrary compositions in the
state space.
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Figure 1: G for HTTP arrangements (A)
sequence. For this reason, we also define the set of ar-
rangements asA ⊆ paths(G) such thatA are the maximal-
length members of paths(G); for example, all members of
A for the HTTP application are sequences beginning with a
single client followed by a sequence of zero or more prox-
ies and terminating with a single server.
One can also imagine more involved systems, such as
those in which the composition structure more resembles
a tree or a digraph than the sequences represented by
paths(G). CHAIN actually deals principally in rewriting
sets of strings; since such sets can easily be used to encode
multi-path structures, CHAIN can also be used to effec-
tively “rewrite” such graphs by rewriting their constituent
paths.
3.2 Arrangement Properties
We are interested in identifying the members of A which
satisfy (or fail to satisfy) desirable properties, e.g., those
that are deadlock-free. Let π denote such a property, which
can be viewed as a boolean-valued function π : A →
{true, false}. Our primary methodological goal is to ob-
tain a “friendly” specification of the two sets:
Atrue = {a ∈ A |π(a) = true}
and
Afalse = {a ∈ A |π(a) = false}.
By “friendly” we mean, at a minimum, there is a feasible
computation to determine whether a ∈ A true or a ∈ Afalse
for any member of A; ideally, we would also like to de-
vise an easy-to-understand formalism to describeA true and
Afalse, which can be used to quickly (in polynomial time or
better) test whether a ∈ Atrue or a ∈ Afalse. We will devise
such tests below in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.3.
3.3 CHAIN Reductions
Consider a graphG as described above and a property π on
the set A of arrangements in G. We denote the powerset
of a set S by 2S . We extend π : A → {true, false} to
a function π : 2A → {true, false} by defining8 for every
8Note that other formulations of π(A) can be used to bes reflect the
semantics of π; e.g., π(A) could be the logical OR rather than the logical
AND of all π(a) if that better captures the meaning of π. A partial function
could also be used, in which ⊥ is a result value designating an uncertain
A ∈ 2A:
π(A) =
{
true if π(a) = true for every a ∈ A,
false if π(a) = false for some a ∈ A.
Let A′ be some subset, not necessarily proper, of the
set A of arrangements in G. Because A is a subset of
paths(G), so is A′ a subset of paths(G). A reduction func-
tion on A′ is a function f : paths(G) → 2paths(G) satisfy-
ing two conditions:
Invariance on A′: For every a ∈ A′, it is the case that
π(f(a)) is defined and π(f(a)) = π(a).
Progress on A′:
( ⋃
a∈A′
f(a)
)
 A′.
We can extend f : paths(G) → 2paths(G) to a function
f : 2paths(G) → 2paths(G) by setting f(A) = ⋃a∈A f(a)
for every A ∈ 2paths(G). Thus, the progress condition
above can be expressed more succinctly as f(A ′)  A′.
Informally, the invariance condition says that π is an in-
variant of the transformation from a ∈ A ′ to f(a) ⊂ A′.
In practice, this means that, in order to test whether a ∈ A ′
satisfies property π, it suffices to test whether every b ∈
f(a) satisfies π; as a rule, a desirable reduction is one in
which the aggregate of the latter tests is “easier” computa-
tionally than the former test.
The progress condition is assurance that we gain some-
thing by carrying out the transformation from a ∈ A ′ to
f(a) ⊂ A′, i.e., the set f(A′) is a non-empty proper subset
of A′. In practice, should A′ be an infinite set we will also
want A′ − f(A′) to be an infinite set, i.e., infinitely many
arrangements are excluded from the search space A ′.
The key insight behind a reduction is that it establishes
behavioral equivalence with respect to π within some set
of chains; a reduction is a statement that “the behaviors of
members of set A′ are fully represented by the behaviors
of members of its subset f(A′)”. The means by which this
behavioral equivalence is established may be any mecha-
nism appropriate to the given application and π (e.g., logi-
cal proofs, type systems [7], process algebra [2], theory of
I/O automata [22], I/O equivalence, etc.).
3.4 Reduction Strategy
Intuitively, our strategy is to identify a set of reductions
(i.e., congruence relations over A which preserve behav-
ioral equivalence) by which we can establish a finite-sized
homomorphic image of A (that is, a finite-sized An ⊂ A
such that every member of A is behaviorally equivalent
with members of An).
Starting fromA0 = A, our proposed strategy is to define
a nested sequence of strictly decreasing subspaces:
A0 ⊃ A1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ An
or undefined result.
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induced by a sequence of appropriately defined functions
g1, g2, . . . , gn where gi : paths(G) → 2paths(G) is derived
from a reduction function on A i−1 (or the corresponding
set-reduction function) and Ai = gi(Ai−1) for every 1 
i  n. If successful, this strategy produces a finite search
space An such that
An = gn(· · · (g2(g1(A))) · · · )
which implies that for every a ∈ A
An ⊇ gn(· · · (g2(g1(a))) · · · )
and
π(a) = π(gn(· · · (g2(g1(a))) · · · )).
3.5 Practical Specification of Reductions
A second methodological goal of our study is a formula-
tion of reduction functions which are both easy to under-
stand and easy to apply in practice. We propose a single
framework to simultaneously achieve these two goals—this
one and the one mentioned in Section 3.2—by borrowing
ideas from algebraic notions of term-rewriting and by us-
ing standard techniques for manipulating sets and regular
expressions.
Consider some G = (N , E) as defined above. Let Var
be a countable infinite set of formal variables; we use the
letters x, y and z (possibly decorated) to denote members
of Var. Let Σ = N ∪ Var. We use the letters X , Y and Z
(possibly decorated) as metavariables ranging over the set
Σ∗. If X ∈ Σ∗, the set of formal variables occurring in X
is denoted Var(X).
We introduce a particular notion of rewrite rules. Each
such rewrite rule R will be specified by an expression of
the form
R : X ✄ {Y1, . . . , Yn}
satisfying the following conditions:
• n  1, i.e., the right-hand side is a non-empty finite
set,
• X,Y1, . . . , Yn ∈ Σ+, and
• Var(Y1) ∪ · · · ∪ Var(Yn) ⊆ Var(X).
An interpretation of Var (for the givenG) is simply a func-
tion ρ : Var → paths(G), which is lifted to a function
ρ¯ : Σ∗ → paths(G) by induction in the obvious way:
1. ρ¯(ε) = ε,
2. ρ¯(XN) = ρ¯(X)N ,
3. ρ¯(X x) = ρ¯(X) ρ(x),
where X ∈ Σ∗, N ∈ N , and x ∈ Var. We use ε to denote
the empty string.
Let a, b1, . . . , bn ∈ paths(G). We say a rewrites to the
set {b1, . . . , bn}, using rule R in one step, which we ex-
press as:
a ✄R {b1, . . . , bn},
just in case there is an interpretation ρ : Var → paths(G)
such that ρ¯(X) = a and ρ¯(Yi) = bi for every 1  i  n.
A rewrite rule R as described above induces a function
fR : paths(G) → 2paths(G) as follows. For every a ∈
paths(G), we define:
fR(a) =
{
{a} if a ✄RB for all finite B ⊂ paths(G),⋃{B ⊂ paths(G) | a ✄R B } otherwise.
Following standard notation, we write f (0)R (a) = {a} and
f
(k+1)
R (a) = fR(f
(k)
R (a)) for all k  0. We also define the
function f (∗)R : paths(G)→ 2paths(G) as follows. For every
a ∈ paths(G):
f
(∗)
R (a) =


f
(k)
R (a) if there exists k  0 such that
f
(k+1)
R (a) = f
(k)
R (a),
where k is the least such,
undefined if no such k  0 exists.
Informally, f (∗)R (a) returns a fix-point of fR obtained by
repeated application of fR to a, if it exists.
Now, consider the set A of arrangements in G, a prop-
erty π on A, and some subset A′ ⊆ A. We say that the
rewrite rule R is a reduction on A′ provided that the func-
tion f (∗)R : paths(G) → 2paths(G) induced by R is a re-
duction on A′ satisfying the two conditions defined in Sec-
tion 3.3: invariance on A′ and progress on A′.
Our rewrite rules will satisfy a pleasant condition guar-
anteeing that f (∗)R (a) is always defined. Let us say that the
rule R is bounded-monotonic in M iff for some metric M
with a minimum value and for all a, b1, . . . , bn ∈ paths(G)
such that a✄R{b1, . . . , bn},
M(a) > M(b1) , . . . , M(a) > M(bn).
Lemma 3.1. If the rewrite rule R is bounded-monotonic
then, for every a ∈ paths(G), it holds that f (∗)R (a) is de-fined, and is a non-empty finite subset of paths(G).
The simplest choice for such a metric is string length
(which has a minimum value of zero); where a rule is
not length-decreasing, it must be shown to be bounded-
monotonic in some other metric.
3.6 Confluence of CHAIN Reductions
As with any term re-writing system, at least two properties
are important to establish: termination (i.e., every arrange-
ment can be rewritten only finitely many times) and con-
fluence (i.e., if a can be rewritten to b1 and b2, then further
rewriting of both of those can produce a single string c).
Termination ensures that the system draws some conclu-
sion, while confluence demonstrates the system’s internal
consistency; the combination of these two properties im-
plies that the final result of the rewriting process is canon-
ical, and that the rewriting process encodes an equivalence
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class for each possible result. Establishing confluence also
helps to minimize the size of the result set.
A set of rewrite rules terminate if the effects of all rules
are bounded-monotonic with respect to a single metric; for
example, if all rules are length-decreasing the a system of
such rules must terminate. By Newman’s Lemma [1], we
know that a rewrite system which terminates is confluent
iff it is locally confluent (i.e., given arrangement a which
can be rewritten in one step to B1 or to B2, both B1 and
B2 can be rewritten in zero or more steps to B3). We there-
fore need only determine local confluence between pairs of
rewrite rules in order to establish confluence and (thereby)
the canonicity of the terminal result of rewriting any ar-
rangement.
In the simplest cases, a pair of rewrite rules Ri and
Rj are locally confluent if they are commutative, i.e.,
f
(∗)
i (f
(∗)
j (a)) ≡ f (∗)j (f (∗)i (a)) for all a ∈ A. As much as
possible, we rely upon this property in our local confluence
proofs.9
It should be noted that a non-confluent set of rewrite
rules is not a failure of our methodology. In those sys-
tems where rewrite rules represent behavioral equivalence,
rewrites embody a transitive property; it follows that any
such divergence identifies additional equivalence relation-
ships which can give rise to valid rewrite rules.
As such, any arrangement a ∈ A for which two rewrite
rulesRi andRj provide diverging evaluation paths actually
becomes an instance of a proper behavioral equivalence re-
lation; fi(a) and fj(a) are behaviorally equivalent sets (be-
cause of the Invariance property), and as such if either set
has only one member, the pair can be directly transformed
into a previously unknown reduction. Such additional re-
lations resolve the failures of local confluence, but must
then be tested for interference with each other and the orig-
inal rule set; this can be performed mechanically using the
Knuth-Bendix procedure [18].
3.7 Sufficient Subspaces
If f (∗)R is always defined, then the application of f
(∗)
R to
all members of a language A will yield some subset of A
such that, for every a ∈ A, the value of π(a) can be easily
determined from π(f (∗)R (a)). For this reason, we refer to
the output f (∗)R (A) as a sufficient subspace.
In the rest of the paper, when there is no ambiguity, no-
tions that have been defined for a rewrite rule R are ex-
tended to the function f (∗)R in the obvious way; for ex-
ample, we say “f (∗)R is length-decreasing” if R is length-
decreasing.
It is also convenient to introduce the notion of the sup-
port of the function f (∗)R , or of its associated rewrite rule
9This is a special case of the general definition of local confluence:
A pair is locally confluent if there exist compositions (call them F1 and
F2) of fis drawn from the full set of valid rewrite rules (R) such that
F1(f
(∗)
i (a)) ≡ F2(f(∗)j (a)) for all a ∈ A. Intuitively, this means two
rules are confluent if the divergence they introduce can be reconciled by
any sequences of additional rewrites.
R:
support(f (∗)R ) = support(R) = {a ∈ A | f (∗)R (a) = {a}},
i.e., support(f (∗)R ) is the portion of A on which f (∗)R acts
non-trivially; so,
f
(∗)
R (A) = (A− support(f (∗)R )) ∪ f (∗)R (support(f (∗)R ))
Recall our stated strategy from Section 3.4: to define
a nested sequence of strictly decreasing subspaces A =
A0 ⊃ A1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ An induced by a sequence of re-
duction functions f1, . . . , fn. In what follows, for every
1  i  n, we use fi to denote the f (∗)Ri induced by the
bounded-monotonic rewrite rule R i.
A trivial approach to this goal is to find
fn(· · · (f2(f1(A))) · · · ). However, such a formulation
fails to properly account for convolutions of rewrite rules.
For example, consider a system in which R1 reduces all
sequences of “a”s to a single “a” and R2 removes any “b”
appearing immediately between two “a”s; for the string
aba, clearly f (∗)2 (f
(∗)
1 (aba)) = f (∗)1 (f (∗)2 (f (∗)1 (aba)));
the convolution of f1 and f2 has a greater effect than their
sequential application.
Rather than composing the functions as such, we indi-
vidually consider the effect of each rule upon A, and then
take the intersection of the resulting sufficient subsets. The
intersection operator allows our examination of each f i to
wholly exclude from future consideration all arrangements
reduced away by fi.
Lemma 3.2. Consider a set of reductions R =
{R1, . . . , Rn} inducing functions F = {f (∗)R1 , . . . , f
(∗)
Rn
}
which are all monotonic with respect to some metric. A suf-
ficient subspaceAn can be defined inductively where 0 < n
and A0 = A as:
An = An−1
⋂
f
(∗)
Ri
(A)
or directly as:
An =
n⋂
i=1
(
f
(∗)
Ri
(A)
)
(1)
which can be equivalently stated as:
An =
n⋂
i=1
(
A− support(f (∗)Ri )
)
∪ f (∗)Ri (support(f
(∗)
Ri
)) .
(2)
Where the set of reductions is clear from context and
where An (the sufficient subspace which is most reduced
with respect to the given reductions) is of finite ordinality,
we refer to it as A.
Corollary 3.2.1. π(A) = π(A).
Intuitively, this corollary tells us that if we can prove some
property (e.g., freedom from deadlocks) for all members
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Standard Client Proxy Server
RFC1945 (HTTP/1.0) C0 P0 S0
RFC2068 (obsolete HTTP/1.1) C1 P1 S1
RFC2616 (HTTP/1.1) C2 P2 S2
Table 1: HTTP Agent Models
Rewrite Rule Ai, i.e., fi(A)
x P0 y ✄R1 { x S0, C0 y } A − CP∗ P0 P∗S
x P0 P0 y✄R2 { x P0 y, C0 S0 } A − CP∗ P0 P0 P∗S
C2 P2 x ✄R3 { C2 x } A − C2 P2 P∗S
x P2 S2✄R4 { x S2 } A − CP∗ P2 S2
x P2 P2 y✄R5 { x P2 y } A − CP∗ P2 P2 P∗S
x P1 P1 P1 y ✄R6 { x P1 P1 y } A − CP∗ P1 P1 P1 P∗S
C0 P1 x ✄R7 { C1 x } A − C0 P1 P∗S
x P1 P2 P1 y ✄R8 { x P1 P1 y } A − CP∗ P1 P2 P1 P∗S
C1 P1 P1 x ✄R9 { C1 P1 x } A − C1 P1 P1 P∗ S
C1 P2 P1 x ✄R10 { C1 P1 x } A − C1 P2 P1 P∗ S
Table 2: Rewrite rules (R1, . . . , R10) and their resulting
sufficient subspaces (f1(A), . . . , f10(A))
of the minimal sufficient subset (i.e., {π(a) = true | a ∈
A}), then we have also proven that same property for all
members of the original (infinite) set A.
4 Example Applications of CHAIN
In this section, we exemplify the application of the CHAIN
approach to a series of interesting network protocol correct-
ness problems. We begin with a detailed completion of our
example of HTTP request continuation deadlock-safety in
order to clearly illustrate the workings of CHAIN. We then
proceed to a more abbreviated discussion of its application
to the analysis of an applet for selective dropping of MPEG
frames in an overlay network. Finally, we sketch its appli-
cation to a web intra-cache consistency algorithm.
4.1 HTTP Deadlock-Safety
Through careful study of our models of HTTP protocol
agents, we have derived and proven a set of rewrite rules
which preserve the behavior of chains with respect to
HTTP request continuation. If an arrangement is deadlock-
prone, then any arrangement which can be rewritten to that
one will also be deadlock-prone; likewise, any arrangement
to which it can be rewritten will also be deadlock-prone.
The same holds for arrangements which are deadlock-free.
The derivation of these and other rules is discussed in
greater depth in [6]. Eight of the rules derived there per-
taining to our current goal are presented in Table 2, along
with two more rules (R9 and R10), the derivation of which
will be discussed below.
In this paper, we refer to particular models using the
letter-number pairs presented in Table 1; these represent
the favored models for each revision/role.
All of the listed rules are proper rewrite rules as defined
in Section 3.5, satisfying the three necessary conditions:
(1) each has a non-empty right-hand side; (2) all strings are
members of Σ+; and (3) all Var(Yi) ⊆ Var(X). Notice
that these rules are also all length-decreasing, which im-
plies (by Lemma 3.1) that f (∗)Ri is always defined for all
of them. Therefore, each of the preceding rewrite rules
Ri gives rise to a function f (∗)Ri , henceforth denoted by fi.
The support of fi, and the set to which fi maps its sup-
port, are presented in Table 2 using regular expressions.
For brevity, C = (C0 | C1 | C2), P = (P0 | P1 | P2), and
S = (S0 | S1 | S2).
Notice also that each fi (i.e., each f (∗)Ri ) is a valid re-
duction function, in that it satisfies the invariance and
the progress properties. Invariance was previously estab-
lished; progress holds because for every f i it is true that
fi(A)  A.
4.1.1 Confluence
We next ask whether this set of reductions is confluent,
i.e., whether every arrangement a ∈ A will be terminally
rewritten to a single result set independent of the reduction
strategy. Because our set of rewrite rules will terminate
(because they are all length-decreasing), this is equivalent
to asking if the set of reductions is locally confluent.
The local confluence of most pairs of reductions is
straightforward to see, because the rules are independent.
Clearly R1 and R2 operate upon chains which no other re-
ductions operate upon; the cluster of R3, R4, and R5 like-
wise are clearly independent in their effects of the predicate
chains ofR1, R2, R6, R7, and R8, and similarly the cluster
of R6, R7, and R8 are independent of the first five rules.
So our only concern is local confluence within these three
clusters.
R1 and R2: Since R2 is an instantiation of R1, these two
clearly do not lead to contradictory rewrite strategies.
R3, R4 and R5: All three of these rules remove P2
from chains. Consider the one case where both R3 and
R4 apply to the same P2, namely, a = C2 P2 S2. f3
and f4 remain commutative, because f (0)R3 (f
(1)
R4
(a)) =
f
(0)
R4
(f (1)R3 (a)). Similarly, consider the set of chains over
which R3 and R5 conflict, namely, a = C2 P2 P2 x
for any x; f3 and f5 are clearly commutative because
f
(0)
R3
(f (1)R5 (a)) = f
(0)
R5
(f (1)R3 (a)) when f5 affects the speci-
fied subchain of a. The same proof holds for the pairing of
R4 and R5. Since all three pairings of these three rewrites
commute, the set is locally confluent.
R6, R7 and R8: While rules R6 and R8 are clearly in-
dependent in their effects, the other two pairs within this
cluster are not commutative.
• R6 and R7: These rewrite rules diverge on chains of
the form C0 P1 P1 P1 x. R7 rewrites this expression
to C1 P1 P1 x, andR6 rewrites it to C0 P1 P1 x; while
the latter can then be rewritten using R7 to C1 P1 x,
they still identify different sets, and there exists no
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rewrite strategy which will (for all values of x) rewrite
both of these to a common expression.
• R7 and R8: These rewrite rules diverge on chains of
the form C0 P1 P2 P1 x. R7 rewrites this expression
to C1 P2 P1 x, while R8 rewrites it to C0 P1 P1 x.
Much as above, the second expression can again be re-
written to C1 P1 x, but from there no rewrite strategy
exists to rewrite these to a common expression.
Applying the procedure discussed in Section 3.6, each
of these conflicts is transformed into a new valid rewrite
rule in a straightforward way so as to preserve the length-
decreasing property; the results are rules R9 and R10,
which succeed in rendering the system confluent, so fur-
ther iteration of the procedure is not necessary.
Theorem 4.1. The set of rewrite rulesR = {R1, . . . , R10}
is confluent.
Proof. The local confluence of most rule pairs is already
discussed above. The two new rewrite rules are indepen-
dent of each other and independent of the original eight
rules, with the exception that R9 and R6 have identi-
cal effect upon expressions C1 P1 P1 P1 x and are thus
commutative, and that R10 and R6 have identical effect
upon expressions C1 P2 P1 P1 P1 x and are thus com-
mutative. Both of the failures of local confluence among
{R1, . . . , R8} are addressed by application of the two new
rules. Therefore,R is locally confluent.
Because the rules are all length-decreasing (and there-
fore bounded-monotonic), the system terminates; by New-
man’s Lemma, it is therefore confluent.
Corollary 4.1.1. The set of rewrite rules R =
{R1, . . . , R10} defines a canonical subset of A for ev-
ery a ∈ A, i.e., every a ∈ A is a member of an equivalence
class defined by a subset of A.
4.1.2 Reducing the Model Space
Recall Equations 1 and 2, which are the “glue” of our strat-
egy. For each fi we find fi(A), i.e.:
(A− support(fi)) ∪ fi(support(fi))
We denote such a set induced by any fi as Ai. Using
the above-described supports and the sets they are mapped
to, Table 2 presents these in simplified regular expression
form for each of f1 through f10.
Taking the intersection of these sufficient subspaces
gives us the finite minimal sufficient subspace supported
by the given reduction functions. We will use both regu-
lar expressions and finite state automata (in the style of the
graph G described earlier) to describe such subspaces (sets
of strings) for the remainder of this paper as appropriate.
The automaton forA is a simple nine-state machine with
three start states each with no inbound edges (C0, C1, and
C2), three end states with no outbound edges (S0, S1, and
S2), and three intermediary states (P0, P1, and P2) which
C1
C2
C0
P1
P2
S0
S1
S2
P2
P1
Figure 2: Automaton forA10−CS, i.e.,A1∩· · ·∩A10−CS
((C P∗ P1) | C1) (P1 | P2+) (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
((C P∗ P1) | C1 | C2) (P1 | P2)∗ P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
Figure 3: Deadlock-Prone Arrangements (Theorem 4.3)
are fully connected with one another, each connected to by
every start state, and each connecting to every end state.
Each start state also connects directly to every end state.
This was already illustrated in Figure 1.
The intersection of the ten sets A1 . . . A10 is presented in
Figure 2 as an automaton. (For visual clarity, the CS edges
have been omitted; each client also has an edge to each
server.) This represents the minimal sufficient subset of A
under the ten reductions R1 . . . R10. Of particular signifi-
cance is that this set is finite (equivalently, the automaton
is acyclic, or the regular expression has no unbounded rep-
etitions). As such, we have satisfied the goal of our strat-
egy by identifying a finite An = A1 ∩ · · · ∩ A10 which
is a sufficient subset of A. This set A10 has 29 member
strings; thus, it is sufficient to compute π(a) for only these
29 members of A in order to acquire a trivial procedure for
the determination of π(a) for any a ∈ A. We have thus
proven the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2. Let A be the infinite space of all arrange-
ments of HTTP agents as defined in Section 3.1, and let R
be the set of rewrite rules discussed above which preserve
behavioral equivalence. We can construct a finite subset
A of A, consisting of 29 member arrangements, which
satisfies the following condition: By the application of R,
every a ∈ A can be rewritten to a subset B ofA such that
a satisfies π if and only if every b ∈ B satisfies π.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 3.2 and the above
analysis.
A π Decision Rule Using Failure Patterns: As alluded
to above, we would ultimately like to express a decision
rule in a compact and computationally efficient form which
will allow us to decide {π(a) | a ∈ A}. In [5], we hap-
pened upon a pair of “failure patterns” which accounted
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for all failure cases explored in that paper. Here we argue
for the correctness of a pair of failure patterns derived from
A and the above reductions–a process that methodically
discovers all deadlock cases for all arrangements in A.
Theorem 4.3. All a ∈ A such that π(a) = false will match
a regular expression stated in Figure 3.
Proof. Among a ∈ A10, all a such that π(a) = false (that
is, all a ∈ Afalse) match at least one of the stated patterns,
and no a such that π(a) = true (i.e., no a ∈ Atrue) matches
either.
As we have shown, all members of A which are
deadlock-prone are reducible to members ofA 10 which are
deadlock-prone, and similarly, all members of A which are
deadlock-safe are reducible to members of A10 which are
deadlock-safe.
As such, the correctness of this theorem rests upon three
properties: (1) for any member a ∈ A10, π(a) = false iff
a is in the union of these patterns (that is, the patterns cor-
rectly identifyAfalse∩A10); (2) any member of the union of
these two patterns is reducible to a member ofA false∩A10;
(3) no arrangement a ∈ A which does not match either of
these patterns can be reduced to one which does. 10 Item-
by-item proofs of these properties are included in Appendix
A.
4.2 An MPEG Overlay Routing Protocol
While model checking is often applied in post mortem fash-
ion to assess bugs and problems in existing protocols and
software, this need not be the case. This section presents an
application of CHAIN approaching the problem from a de-
sign perspective rather than a retroactive analysis perspec-
tive.
Many algorithms proposed for overlay networks are, by
their nature, designed to be deployed into a network in
which they will interact with other applications, as well
as conventional routers and hosts (i.e., we expect that they
will be composed with other processes, perhaps both con-
trolled and emergent). Thus it seems reasonable to believe
that such applications are good candidates for analysis us-
ing CHAIN.
Consider the method for handling MPEG flows pro-
posed in [15], which drops MPEG frames based upon its
own drop history and the dependency and priority relation-
ships between the three classes of MPEG frames (I, P, and
B frames).11 These relationships suggest simple packet-
dropping rules: (1) If at all possible, dropping I frames
should be avoided; (2) once a B frame has been dropped, all
successor B frames until the next P frame are useless and
10The second and third properties taken together represent the closure
of the set described by these expressions under all reductions in R.
11MPEG streams are structured as follows: each I frame signifies the
beginning of a new group of pictures (GOP). Within a GOP, each P frame
can only be decoded if the initial I frame and all previous P frames have
been received. Similarly, a B frame can only be decoded if the previous
P frame could be decoded and if all B frames between that P frame and
itself have been received.
should be dropped; and similarly (3) once a P frame has
been dropped, all successor packets can be safely dropped
until the next I frame. The applet presented in [15] imple-
ments a simple version of this algorithm requiring constant
time and storage.
Unfortunately, the router12 so described must itself re-
ceive all of the packets constituting an MPEG stream in or-
der to behave correctly. These are unreasonably optimistic
assumptions [25]; indeed, it is not hard to devise patholog-
ical reorderings among pairs of sequentially adjacent pack-
ets which can cause the applet to wrongly treat large num-
bers of frames as “worthless” (and therefore discardable),
and if certain packets are dropped before reaching such a
router, it can erroneously forward large numbers of worth-
less packets.
We can easily cast either or both of these concerns
(packet ordering and drop-tolerance) in CHAIN. There
is nothing intrinsic to a network which drops or reorders
packets that prevents it from being represented as an agent
in the same sense in which the MPEG router is an agent.
Therefore, it makes sense for us to ask within our frame-
work whether the composition of a packet-reordering net-
work with such a router would cause it to behave erro-
neously (that is, to drop packets which could still be valu-
able to an end-host)? Does the direct composition of two
such routers induce packet drops that a single such router
would not? What about composing two such routers using
a packet-reordering network, or composing two network-
router pairs? What about compositions with other kinds of
routers which perform random drops, or which may do re-
transmissions on their own (e.g., a wireless base station)?
All of these questions can be framed in terms of a binary
correctness property π which determines whether packets
could be erroneously dropped by any particular composi-
tion of those components.13
4.2.1 Representing and Reducing the Network
Some reductions naturally arise as properties of the basic
existing network infrastructure; For example:
R1 : x reord reord y ✄ {x reord y}
R2 : x drop drop y ✄ {x drop y}
R3 : x reord drop y ✄ {x drop reord y}
12We henceforth use “router” to mean a node in an (overlay) network
that handles the forwarding of the packet to one (or more) other nodes in
the network.
13The MPEG router is itself allowed to drop packets when its down-
stream link load is too high. This means that, for the purposes of π,
whenever the router wants to forward a packet there are three possible
outcomes: An overload drop, a correct forwarding, and a “legal” drop. It
is not appropriate for this question to consider a notion of “how many”
drops are acceptable - a drop is either inevitable because of link overload
(which may arise at arbitrary times), correct (because previous drops ren-
der the packet worthless), or illegal (the packet was still valuable and the
link was not overloaded). A different π property could be defined and
examined to include a notion of drop rate, or bounded delay and jitter, or
anything else of interest.
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server
client
reord
drop
mrouter
Figure 4: A4 for basic MPEG-routing network
Notice that the third rule forces a particular ordering upon
adjoining reord and drop nodes; in so doing, these three
rules together form a compound rule which says that any
chain consisting only of both drop and record can be rep-
resented with a single canonical chain, “drop reord”.14
We also note that the mrouter node will always be per-
mitted to drop packets because of internal congestion; thus,
another rule will always be applicable15:
R4 : x mrouter drop y ✄ {x mrouter y}
Ultimately, we would like to be able to say something
about the mrouter in any network arrangement. Assuming
that all the relevant characteristics of intervening networks
can be represented using models of record and drop, we
can then define A as SP∗ mrouter C, where
S = server
P = mrouter, reord, drop
C = client
This definition handles two simplifications of the problem
space for us up front: it excludes all arrangements which
do not include at least one mrouter (i.e., all arrangements
in which we are not interested) and it removes all reord
or drop which do not precede an mrouter (because they
have no bearing upon the correctness of an mrouter). Given
the already-stated four reductions, we can derive A4 (pic-
tured in Figure 4) using the corresponding f1, . . . , f4. A4
clearly still represents an infinite set of arrangements (or
language), so our methodology will require additional re-
ductions in order to produce useful results.
Reducibility as Specification: Rather than thinking in
terms of the reductions which a particular fully-specified
application induces, one may prefer to state a design goal
for an application in terms of a set of reductions which that
application must satisfy. For example, we could state as a
14This is where exclusion of reductions becomes useful; while the in-
verse of R3 is also a true proposition, its co-introduction into a system
along with R3 would introduce a rewrite cycle between itself and R3,
which allows the existence of a non-terminating rewrite strategy and def-
initionally precludes the existence of a “canonical” reduction for each ar-
rangement.
15Notice that a similar rule which removes drop from before mrouter
in a chain would also be valid; however, we do not introduce this rule,
as it would interfere structurally with other rules, requiring a much more
involved set of rules to keep the system confluent.
server
client
drop
reord
mrouter mrouter
Figure 5: Acyclic automaton of A6 for an ideal MPEG
router
design property that a sequence of identical agents will be
behaviorally equivalent to a single such agent; any protocol
or implementation which disagrees with this property will
fail to meet the design constraints.
We can then state, as an engineering goal, that mrouter
should provably satisfy a set of reductions which yield a
finite An. The choice of proof method is not particularly
important; whichever is best suited to the design and de-
velopment environment can equally well be used. The
following reductions would be sufficient, and make for an
illustrative example of target reductions which could be set
as correctness criteria for some mrouter formulation:
R5 : x mrouter mrouter y ✄ {x mrouter y}
R6 : x reord mrouter reord mrouter y ✄
{x drop reord mrouter y}
If all six reductions are valid, then A6 has six members;
thus, by testing only those six, we establish the behavior
of mrouter in all possible network configurations. A6 is
expressed by the automaton in Figure 5.
Confluence: Proof that this system of rewrite rules is
confluent (and therefore gives rise to a canonical form) is
straightforward.
Theorem 4.4. The set of rewrite rules R = {R1, . . . , R6}
is confluent.
Proof. We begin by proving termination. All rules but R 3
are length-decreasing (and therefore monotonic, so their
corresponding f (∗)’s are defined); R3 does not increase
length and is clearly itself monotonic because it always
moves drop nodes to the left and reord nodes to the right;
the rules are clearly monotonic with respect to a com-
position of these two metrics (length as the major and
drop/reord ordering as the minor component), thus R ter-
minates. We can therefore establish its confluence using
Newman’s Lemma by demonstrating local confluence.
All pairings among R1, R2, R4, R5, and R6 are clearly
commutative over any chains in which their effects overlap.
R3 is similarly commutative with R4, R5, and R6. This
leaves only the pairings of R3 with R1 and R2.
Consider the chain reord reord drop. By R1 it is rewrit-
ten to reord drop; by R3 it is rewritten to reord drop reord.
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Notice that these are indeed confluent: the former can then
be rewritten byR3 to drop reord and the later can be rewrit-
ten by R3 (again) to drop reord reord, which can be rewrit-
ten by R1 to drop reord. A similar case arises when R3
is paired with R2. Therefore, the lack of commutativity
within these pairs is resolved by the existence of a succeed-
ing rewrite strategy which brings their results into agree-
ment.
Since R is both locally confluent and terminating, it is
therefore confluent.
It is easy to devise variations upon this R which express
the same properties of the problem space but are difficult
to make confluent16; e.g., an additional rule (based upon
the rationale of R4) which removes a drop preceding an
mrouter is non-commutative with R3, and converting this
conflict into an additional rewrite rule does not result in
confluence; many iterations of the Knuth-Bendix proce-
dure are required to resolve this divergence. As another
example, if R3 is replaced with its inverse, a similar con-
flict arises between it andR6, and the simplest apparent so-
lution (resolved by including both R3 and its inverse) does
not work because the pair support allow a non-terminating
rewrite strategy.
4.2.2 Algorithms Resilient to Network Anomalies
We now discuss modified versions of the algorithm from
[15] which are more resilient to common network anoma-
lies. We use a modification of their proposed packet header
which adds an integer field, “dep frame no”. In an I-
frame, this field has the same value as frame no. In a P-
frame, dep frame no is the frame no of the previous
P-frame within the GOP, or the frame no of the previ-
ous I-frame if this is the first P-frame in the GOP. For a B-
frame, dep frame no is the frame no of the previous
P-frame. This field acts to make explicit and unambiguous
the dependency relationships among packets.
For the purposes of this section, we will use the words
“frame” (in the MPEG sense) and “packet” (in the IP rout-
ing sense) interchangeably.
Missing Packets: If the packet stream remains in order
but may lose packets before reaching the mrouter, then
we can easily implement an aggressive drop algorithm.
In addition to the new header field, we require that each
“movie” record include the frame no of the last frame
forwarded as part of that movie. The arrival of a packet
whose frame no is greater than the previous frame no
plus one indicates packet loss; the response depends upon
the type of the arriving packet and the (inferred) types of
(some) dropped packets. Pseudocode for an algorithm is
given in Figure 6.
Essentially, we have used the dep frame no field,
taken together with the frame type, to deduce the type of
16Note that this does not contradict Knuth-Bendix or our claims in Sec-
tion 3.6; this is a statement about the simplicity and compactness of the set
of rewrite rules, not about the ability of the system to be made confluent.
Require: packet p
if p is I-frame then
drop PB mode = drop B mode=false
forward p
last frame no = p.frame no
else if p is P-frame then
if drop PB mode==true then
drop p
else
if last frame no < p.dep frame no then
drop p
drop PB mode = drop B mode = true
else
forward p
drop B mode=false
last frame no = last pframe no = p.frame no
end if
end if
else if p is B-frame then
if drop B mode==true then
drop p
else
if last pframe no < p.dep frame no then
drop p
drop PB mode = drop B mode = true
else if last frame no < p.frame no - 1 then
drop p
drop B mode = true
else
forward p
last frame no = p.frame no
end if
end if
end if
Figure 6: Algorithm resilient only to missing packets
the missing packet (or that of the most important packet
within a gap) and to choose a drop strategy accordingly.
This algorithm would precede all local policy decisions,
including congestion-driven drops; acting as such, it pre-
vents “worthless” packets from reaching the overlay rout-
ing logic.
Using this implementation of the mrouter, we can easily
prove target reductionR5, as the second mrouter will in all
cases pass through packets forwarded by the first. Proving
R6 is more involved; we omit it for want of space17. Since
all rewrite rules in R apply for this algorithm, CHAIN al-
lows us to explore its correctness under all possible net-
works using only the six arrangements in A (the homo-
morphic image of all arrangements).
Reordered Packets: For each movie, we add three ring
buffers acting as “policy drop logs”: one for I-frames,
one for P-frames, and one for B-frames (drop I log,
drop P log, and drop B log, respectively). Each
17A rough sketch of the proof is as follows: because the algorithm is
run before congestion can induce drops within the mrouter, it is unaware
of such drops, so any subset of a packet sequence can be dropped by a
reord mrouter chain; therefore, that chain can be represented to its peers
as reord drop. If we use this to rewrite the first such subchain in the
predicate, we get drop reord reord mrouter which (by R1) is equivalent
to drop reord mrouter. We must also capture the behaviors of the initial
reord mrouter in case they would induce an illegal drop; since one of the
behaviors of drop reord mrouter captures exactly that, all behaviors of
the predicate are captured by the consequent, ergo they are behaviorally
equivalent.
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Require: packet p
Require: congestion drops noted in drop * log
if p is I-frame then
forward p
else if p is P-frame then
if dep frame no ∈ drop P log ∪ drop I log then
drop p
note p.frame no in drop P log
else
forward p
end if
else if p is B-frame then
if p.dep frame no ∈ drop P log then
drop p
note p.frame no in drop B log
else if ∃ z∈ drop B log s.t. p.dep frame no < z < p.frame no then
drop p
note p.frame no in drop B log
end if
end if
Figure 7: Algorithm resilient only to reordering
backlog has a fixed size NI , NP , NB; setting all of these to
one will (naturally) minimize the running time and space
requirements of the algorithm, but using larger values of N
makes the algorithm more robust to larger delay/reordering
spans.
The premise of this proposed algorithm is that we will
only drop packets which we know for certain are worth-
less, that is, which we can prove to be so using our re-
tained state. Since frames may arrive out-of-order, a sim-
ple gap in sequence numbers is not sufficient to infer loss;
stronger proof is required. Specifically, we will only make
dependency-drops based upon our own drops driven by in-
ternal congestion or previous policy choices. This is for-
malized by the algorithm in Figure 7.
This algorithm guarantees that the mrouter does not drop
any packet which will still be valuable to the client; it
does this at the expense of more per-movie state (linear in
N ), more per-frame computation (linear in N ), and a less
aggressive drop policy than the naı¨ve original algorithm
(it may keep packets the original would have dropped).
A larger N will allow for a more aggressive drop pol-
icy; it could actually prove to correctly drop more pack-
ets than the original algorithm under certain orderings (as
contrasted with the incorrect drops and incorrect retentions
which the original could induce).
Unlike the drop-resilient algorithm, this algorithm
should retain separate drop logs for each output channel
within the overlay; it would therefore make the most sense
for it to be instantiated after the overlay routing logic on
a per-output-queue basis. This requires a simple augmen-
tation to the routing logic itself in order to make note of
drops18 in the log arrays (probably implemented as ring
buffers).
For this reordering-resilient mrouter, R6 can be easily
proven, since mrouter can drop any subset of a stream if an
appropriate reordering is fed to it by the preceding reord.
18Perhaps such drops will be controlled by the filling of a send buffer,
the closing of a peer’s advertised window, or by some congestion-control
policy of the overlay algorithm itself.
R5, however, only holds in a general sense: recalling that
mrouter is parameterized with the length of the drop logs,
a pair of mrouters each with logs of length n are behav-
iorally equivalent to a single mrouter with logs of length
2n.19 Since (if we allow for this condition) all rules in R
apply for this algorithm, again CHAIN allows us to quan-
tify its correctness in all possible networks using only the
arrangements in A.
Resilience to Both Reordered And Missing Packets:
There is a fundamental difficulty in trying to handle both
of the above network anomalies aggressively in a single,
fixed-state algorithm: a delayed packet is indistinguishable
from a dropped packet until it arrives. It is therefore im-
possible to differentiate the cause of a sequence gap un-
less we queue packets and “release” them when the neces-
sary dependence packets arrive (or drop them when some
threshold number of packets have passed without the de-
pendency’s arrival). Essentially, by the time we could infer
with high confidence that a packet has been dropped, too
many other packets will have already arrived, the storage
of which is too costly for a reasonable minimal-state algo-
rithm (particularly considering that the stored packets may
turn out to be worthless). We therefore offer no such applet
for analysis here.
4.3 Web Intra-Cache Consistency
There is nothing in the CHAIN methodology which is in-
trinsically linked with finite-state model checking; any
methodology which can give rise to proofs and which al-
lows for the discovery of reduction/equivalence relations
among sets of configurations can just as well act as the basis
for defining our property of interest π and the set of reduc-
tion rules R. As an example, in this section we show the
application of this methodology to the characterization of
a web cache system which employs the Basis Token Con-
sistency protocol [4], a protocol whose correctness follows
directly from the definition of vector clocks [11, 23] (its
underlying conceptual mechanism).
For BTC, the interesting π is whether the client at the end
of some arrangement a ∈ A = SP ∗C will be guaranteed
to see an (internally) consistent sequence of responses, i.e.,
one which is temporally non-decreasing.20 If π(a) = true,
then arrangement a will always cause the client’s view of
the server to be consistent (temporally non-decreasing);
π(a) = false indicates that arrangement a can provide a
client with an inconsistent response. Basis Token Con-
sistency (BTC) guarantees such consistency for any sup-
porting cache downstream of a supporting server, regard-
less of the presence of intermediary inconsistent caches
19Another perspective on this is that all of the behavioral modalities of
a pair of mrouters will be possibilistically exhibited by a single mrouter,
although particular instances of correct-drop behavior by a pair will not
be exhibited by a single.
20Note that recency is not relevant in this definition. For other cache
management algorithms, interesting properties to consider could be lower
bounds on recency or upon hit rates under certain classes of request regi-
mens.
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((S (proxy-scrubber | proxy-plain)∗) | (server-btc P∗clean cache-btc (proxy-plain | proxy-scrubber)∗) | (server-btc P∗clean cache-btcpush P∗)) client
Where Pclean = {proxy-plain, cache-plain, cache-btc, cache-btcpush}
Figure 8: Consistent Cache Arrangements for Theorem 4.5
(so long as intermediary proxies do not repress response
headers which they do not understand). This fundamen-
tal property of BTC gives rise directly to a rewrite rule
which preserves π: any number of proxies which do not
“scrub” headers (i.e., proxies which do not flagrantly vio-
late the HTTP specification) between a BTC server and a
BTC downstream agent (client or cache) will not affect π
and can therefore be rewritten out of the set of characteris-
tic arrangements.
A simplified model of the web for BTC’s purposes uses
the following agents:
S ={server-btc, server-plain},
P ={proxy-scrubber, proxy-plain, cache-plain,
cache-btc, cache-btcpush},
C ={client}.
where cache-btcpush uses the end-to-end strong consis-
tency extension [3]. The inclusion of C is pure sugar; the in-
teresting property as far as π is concerned is the state of the
furthest downstream cache, i.e., the caching agent appear-
ing closest to the end of the arrangement. Other types of
agents besides the ones described (e.g., a scrubbing proxy-
cache, a client with either a standard or a BTC cache, or a
server implementing BTC push) can be modeled as partic-
ular sequences of these basic elements.
The definitions of standard proxying and proxy-caching
in light of BTC’s notion of consistency give rise to some ba-
sic reductions, such as the insertion of proxy-plain (cache-
less proxy) agents having no effect, or indifference to the
ordering of proxy-scrubber and cache-plain agents. These
are reflected as reductionsR1 throughR6 in Appendix B.1.
The definition and the correctness of BTC itself gives rise
directly to 14 additional reductions, R7 through R20 also
in Appendix B.1.
These twenty rules, through the application of the
CHAIN methodology, identify a sufficient subset A20 con-
taining four member arrangements, described by the ex-
pression:
A = (server-plain|server-btc) cache-plain≤1 client
where the two arrangements without a cache-plain are
consistency-safe and the two containing a cache-plain are
consistency-unsafe.
Confluence: These twenty rules are not confluent be-
cause some members of Afalse can be rewritten to both
of the false members of A20. Atrue has a simi-
lar problem. The system can easily be made con-
fluent, however, by adding a set of finalizing rewrites
which collapse the two “true” members of A20 into one
(server-btc client ✄ server-plain client) and likewise for
the two “false” members (server-btc cache-plain client ✄
server-plain cache-plain client). The new system of
twenty-two rewrite rules is confluent and produces an A
with only two member arrangements; since π is a binary
property, this implies that result of the rewriting process
itself maps trivially to the value of π(a) for any a ∈ A.
A π Decision Rule Using Correctness Patterns: As in
Theorem 4.3, we wish to use our results to provide a com-
putationally inexpensive rule which can decide π(a) for
any a ∈ A.
Intuitively, we know that a caching system will provide
the client with a consistent view under any of three cir-
cumstances: (1) there are no caches between the server
(whether plain or BTC) and the client; (2) the server sup-
ports BTC, the last cache before the client is reached is
a BTC cache, and there are no scrubbers between the BTC
server and that final cache; (3) the server supports BTC, the
system includes a btcpush cache, and there are no scrubbers
between the server and a btcpush cache.
Theorem 4.5. All caching arrangements which provide a
client with a consistent view of server state (that is, all
members of Atrue) will match the pattern stated in Figure
8.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 4.3. A “safety pattern” is sim-
ply the compliment of a “failure pattern”, so its validity is
established by the same properties: first, whether it cor-
rectly partitionsA; second, whether it defines a set which
is closed under all reductions (that is, reductions preserve
both membership and non-membership).
These properties are proven in Appendix B.2.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented CHAIN, an algebraic ap-
proach that enables the reduction of arbitrary arrangements
of network protocol agents to a canonical, behaviorally-
equivalent (with respect to some correctness property) rep-
resentation, which is amenable to mechanical verification.
Our methodology relies upon the discovery of a sufficient
set of reduction/rewrite relationships, which establish ho-
momorphism between particular arrangement patterns. We
have applied our approach to the verification of safety prop-
erties of three examples: The HTTP request continuation
protocol, an MPEG packet forwarding protocol for overlay
networks, and a Web intra-cache consistency protocol.
On-going Work: In this paper, we have focused upon ap-
plying CHAIN to linear compositions of agents. For some
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applications, this is sufficient (e.g., to model the simple
case of a linear arrangement of proxies); however, such
a methodology is also useful for other graph structures.
For example, a particular cache may have several upstream
caches available to it, any of which can be used to reach
an origin server; the result is a divergent delivery network,
in which there exists more than one path from the origin
server to a cache (generally, a DAG).
CHAIN is not limited to linear composition of agents but
can be applied to more compositionally rich systems, e.g.,
trees and directed graphs. This can be accomplished by en-
coding sets of paths in those graphs as sets of strings and
formulating the rewrite rules so as to effectively rewrite
the graph by rewriting its constituent paths. We are cur-
rently developing applications of CHAIN to several graph-
structured correctness problems.
Broader Vision and Research Agenda: Today, and to a
large extent, “programming” distributed applications over
the Internet suffers from the same lack of organizing prin-
ciples as did programming of stand-alone computers some
thirty years ago. Primeval programming languages were
expressive but unwieldy; software engineering technology
improved not only through better understanding of useful
abstractions, but also by automating the process of verifi-
cation of safety properties both at compile time (e.g., type
checking) and run times (e.g., memory bound checks). We
believe that the same kinds of improvements could find
their way into the programming of distributed Internet ser-
vices. The work we present in this paper is an instance
of our broader goal of applying more rigorous disciplines
to the specification and creation of networked protocols,
programs, and services. The development of CHAIN is an
important milestone in our on-going efforts to provide a
sound framework for integrating a wide range of proof and
verification strategies with the principles of design, devel-
opment, compilation and execution of disciplined and safe
programmable systems.
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A HTTP Deadlock-Safety
For these lemmas, we refer to the union of the subsets of
A defined by each of the two patterns (i.e., the subset of A
which match either or both expressions in Figure 3) as the
“pattern space”.
Lemma A.1. For all a ∈ A⊥, π(a) = false iff a is in the
pattern space.
Proof. We prove this result by brute force. The members
of A⊥ are defined by Figure 3:
(C0 P2 | C1 P2≤1 | C2) P1 P1≤1(S2 | P2≤1(S0 | S1)) | CS
For each member of this set, we determine whether it
matched either of the patterns; eight (8) match only the first
pattern, two (2) match only the second pattern, and five (5)
match both, meaning the pattern suggests that only these
15 of the 49 members of A⊥ are deadlock-prone.
We then compute π(a) for all a ∈ A⊥ arrangements,
and found 15 arrangements to be deadlock-prone. These
fifteen are the same arrangements which were identified by
the patterns above. Therefore, the intersection of the pat-
tern space with A⊥ is precisely the set explicitly found to
be A⊥ ∩ Afalse.
Lemma A.2. All arrangements in the pattern space can be
reduced to members of Afalse ∩ A⊥.
Proof. We already have shown that all members of A can
be reduced to members of A⊥. As such, if all reductions
preserve membership inAfalse (that is, if (π(a) = false)→
(π(f (1)i (a)) = false) for all reduction functions fi), then
all members ofAfalse can clearly be reduced to members of
Afalse ∩ A⊥.
We have factored the pattern space into a set of seven
regular expression which will be easier to reason about.
1. C P∗ P1 P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
2. C P∗ P1 P2+ (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
3. C1 P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
4. C1 P2+ (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
5. C P∗ P1 (P1 | P2)∗ P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
6. C1 (P1 | P2)∗ P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
7. C2 (P1 | P2)∗ P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
We now examine each of the 10 reduction rules and show
that (π(a) = false) → (π(f (1)i (a)) = false) for any ar-
rangements which are members of the sets described by
the above seven patterns.
R1 : x P0 y = x S0,C0 y
Consider an arrangement matching any of the seven
patterns which contains a P0. If that P0 happens to
correspond with the head of the (S0 | P0 P ∗ S) sub-
pattern (common to all patterns), then clearly at least
the x S0 produced arrangement will match the same
original pattern. Thus, R1 preserves membership in
the pattern space.
R2 : x P0+ y = x P0 y
Consider an arrangement matching any of the seven
patterns which contains one or more sequence of P0s.
Those P0s are in one of two locations: either the lead-
ing C P∗ sub-pattern or the trailing (S0 | P0 P ∗ S)
sub-pattern. In both cases, clearly the removal of some
P0s will not effect the match, since all P0s beyond the
first one (and in the former case, even the first one) are
matched by a P∗. Thus, R2 preserves membership in
the pattern space.
R3 : C2 P2∗ x = C2 x
Consider each of the seven patterns:
1,2,5 The removed P2s are matched by theP ∗ term, so
clearly their removal will not effect the match.
3,4,6 Does not apply.
7 The P2s are matched by the (P1 | P2)∗ sub-
pattern, so clearly their removal will not effect
the match.
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Thus, R3 preserves membership in the pattern space.
R4 : x P2∗ S2 = x S2
Consider an arrangement matching any of the seven
patterns which contains the subsequence P2∗ S2.
Clearly, this subsequence can only match the (com-
mon) P∗ S sub-pattern, and thus the removal of the
P2s will not effect the match. Thus, R4 preserves
membership in the pattern space.
R5 : x P2+ y = x P2 y
Consider each of the seven patterns:
1,3 P2s can only appear in the P ∗ terms, so their
removal will not effect the match.
2,4 P2s appear in the P ∗ and P2+ terms, so the re-
moval of those beyond the first will not effect the
match.
5,6,7 P2s appear in theP ∗ and (P1 | P2)∗ sub-patterns,
so their removal will not effect the match.
Thus, R5 preserves membership in the pattern space.
R6 : x P1≥2 y = x P1 P1 y
Consider the seven patterns:
1,2 All P1s beyond the second in a sequence must
match within either the C P ∗ sub-pattern or the
P∗ S sub-pattern, so their removal does not ef-
fect the match.
3,4 All P1 sequences of length greater than one must
match within the P∗ S sub-pattern, so their re-
moval does not effect the match.
5 All P1 sequences of length greater than one must
match within either the P ∗ P1 (P1 |
Pc)∗ P1 sub-pattern or the P ∗ S sub-pattern; in
the former case, removing all beyond the second
P1 will not effect the match (the sub-pattern de-
mands at most the outer two P1s), and in the lat-
ter case, removal of P1s will not effect the match.
6,7 All P1 sequences must match either the
(P1 | P2)∗ P1 sub-pattern or theP ∗ term; in each
case, the removal of P1s beyond the second will
not effect the match.
Thus, R6 preserves membership in the pattern space.
R7 : C0 P1 x = C1 x
Consider the seven patterns:
1 If the leading C0 P1 matches the C P ∗ sub-
pattern, then the reduction has no effect. If the
leading C0 P1 matches the C P∗ P1 sub-pattern,
then the whole arrangement is rewritten to one
of the form C1 P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S), which is pre-
cisely the set recognized by pattern 3.
2 Similar to 1 above; in the latter case, the whole
arrangement is rewritten to one of the form
C1 P2+ (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
which is precisely the set recognized by pattern
4.
3,4,6,7 Reduction does not apply
5 Similar to 1 above; in the latter case, the whole
arrangement is rewritten to have the form
C1 (P1 |P2)∗P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
which is precisely the set recognized by pattern
6.
Thus, R7 preserves membership in the pattern space.
R8 : x P1 P2 P1 y = x P1 P1 y
Consider the seven patterns:
1,2 The subsequence P1 P2 P1 can only match either
the P∗ P1 sub-pattern or the P ∗ term; in either
case, removing the P2 will not effect the match.
3,4 The subsequence P1 P2 P1 can only match the
P∗ term, so removing the P2 will not effect the
match.
5 The subsequence P1 P2 P1 can match either the
P∗ P1, P1 (P1 | P2)∗, or P1 (P1 | P2)∗ P1 sub-
patterns, or one of the P ∗ terms, so in all cases
the removal of the P2 will not effect the match.
6,7 The subsequence P1 P2 P1 can match the
(P1 | P2)∗ or (P1 | P2)∗ P1 sub-patterns, or the
P∗ term, so in all cases the removal of the P2
will not effect the match.
Thus, R8 preserves membership in the pattern space.
R9 : C1 P1 P1 x = C1 P1 x
1 If C P∗ = C1, then the rewrite will match with
pattern 3; otherwise, will not effect the match.
2 If C P∗ = C1 P1, then the rewrite will match
with pattern 4; otherwise, will not effect the
match.
3 If it matches, the second P1 matches within P ∗,
so removal will not effect the match.
4,7 Does not apply.
5 Removed P1 will either be within P ∗ or the first
symbol in (P1 | P2) P1, so removal will not ef-
fect the match.
6 If P1 P1 matches entirely within (P1 | P2)∗, re-
moving one P1 has no effect upon matching; oth-
erwise, matches with 3.
Thus, R9 preserves membership in the pattern space.
R10 : C1 P2 P1 x = C1 P1 x
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1,2,5 Removed P2 will match within P ∗,
so removal does not effect the match.
C P∗ P1 P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
3,4,7 Does not apply.
6 Removed P2 will match within (P1 | P2)∗,
so removal does not effect the match.
C1 (P1 | P2)∗ P1 (S0 | P0 P∗ S)
Thus, R10 preserves membership in the pattern space.
All reductions (R1 . . . R10) preserve membership in the
pattern space.
Lemma A.3. No arrangements outside the pattern space
can be reduced to members of the pattern space.
Proof. This proof is the compliment to that of Lemma A.2;
rather than proving that reductions preserve membership,
we prove that reductions also preserve non-membership.
To do this, it suffices to show that the inversions of the
rewrite functions derived from our reductions can not be
used to produce an arrangement which is not a member of
the pattern space from one which is. From this it follows in-
ductively that no non-member arrangement can be reduced
to a member arrangement.
The inverted rewrite rules (we will call them “produc-
tions”) are easily derived for the equivalences behind R2
through R10. Equivalence R1 tells us that we can treat the
two sub-terms (S0 and P0 P ∗ S) of the common closing
sub-pattern (S0 | P0 P∗ S) as being equivalent for the pur-
poses of matching; thus, we do not treat the P0 P ∗ S sub-
pattern further in this proof, since any deadlock-inducing
subsequences which that sub-pattern would match will be
matched by the more “substantial” parts of the patterns (the
sub-pattern preceding S0).
We now examine the inversions of f2 through f10 (cor-
responding with R2 through R10, respectively) and show
that (π(a) = false) → ((π(b) = false) ∀b ∈ f−1i (a)).
For each, we refer to the same seven-way factoring of the
pattern space used to prove Lemma A.2.
f−12 : x P0 y = x P0
+ y
In all cases, additional P0 are captured in a P ∗. Thus,
f−12 preserves membership in the pattern space.
f−13 : C2 x = C2 P2∗ x
1,2,5 Additional P2 captured by C P ∗.
3,4,6 Does not apply
7 Additional P2 captured by (P1 | P2)∗.
Thus, f−13 preserves membership in the pattern space.
f−14 : x S2 = x P2
∗ S2
Additional P2 captured by P ∗ S. Thus, f−14 preserves
membership in the pattern space.
f−15 : x P2 y = x P2
+ y
1,3 Additional P2 captured by P ∗.
2,4 Additional P2 captured by P ∗ and P2+.
5,6,7 Additional P2 captured by P ∗ and (P1 | P2)∗.
Thus, f−15 preserves membership in the pattern space.
f−16 : x P1
2 y = x P1≥2 y
1,2 Additional P1 captured by P ∗.
3,4 Does not apply.
5 Additional P1 captured by combination of P ∗
and (P1 | P2)∗.
6,7 Additional P1 captured by (P1 | P2)∗ or P∗.
Thus, f−16 preserves membership in the pattern space.
f−17 : C1 x = C0 P1 x
1,2,5 Effect captured by C P ∗.
3 Produces arrangement which matches pattern 1.
4 Produces arrangement which matches pattern 2.
6,7 Produce arrangements which match either pat-
tern 1 or pattern 2.
Thus, f−17 preserves membership in the pattern space.
f−18 : x P1
2 y = x P1 P2 P1 y
1 Produces arrangement which matches pattern 5.
2 Additional P2 captured by P ∗.
3,4 Does not apply.
5 Additional P2 captured by either P ∗ or
(P1 | P2)∗.
6,7 Additional P2 captured by (P1 | P2)∗ or P∗.
Thus, f−18 preserves membership in the pattern space.
f−19 : C1 P1 x = C1 P1+ x
1,2,5 Additional P1 captured by P ∗.
3 Produces arrangement which matches pattern 1.
4,7 Does not apply.
6 Additional P1 captured by (P1 | P1)∗.
Thus, f−19 preserves membership in the pattern space.
f−110 : C1 P1 x = C1 P2 P1 x
1,2,5 Additional P2 captured by P ∗.
3 Produces arrangement which matches pattern 6.
4,7 Does not apply.
6 Additional P2 captured by (P1 | P2)∗.
Thus, f−110 preserves membership in the pattern space.
Thus, no arrangement which can be reduced to one
within the pattern space is itself outside of the pattern
space; therefore, no non-member can be reduced to a mem-
ber, so non-membership is preserved by the ten reduc-
tions.
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1 (server-plain | server-btc) (proxy-scrubber | proxy-plain)∗ client
2 server-btc P∗clean cache-btc (proxy-plain | proxy-scrubber)∗ client
3 server-btc P∗clean cache-btcpushP ∗ client
Table 3: BTC π decision rule patterns
B Web Intra-Cache Consistency
B.1 Reduction Rules
R1 : x proxy-plain y ✄ x y
(plain proxying has no effect upon caching)
R2 : x cache-plain cache-plain y ✄ x cache-plain y
(plain proxying has no incremental/marginal effect)
R3 : x proxy-scrubber proxy-scrubber y ✄
x proxy-scrubber y
(adjacent scrubbers have no incremental/marginal
effect)
R4 : x proxy-scrubber cache-plain y ✄
x cache-plain proxy-scrubber y
(because cache-plainignored BTC headers, the order
of this pair doesn’t matter, so we normalize it)
R5 : server-plain proxy-scrubber x ✄ server-plain x
(a scrubbing proxy has no effect upon a plain server,
as there is nothing to scrub)
R6 : x proxy-scrubber client ✄ x client
(a scrubbing proxy has no effect upon a cacheless
client)
R7 : x cache-btc cache-btc y ✄ x cache-btc y
(successive BTC caches add no incremental value)
R8 : x cache-btcpush cache-btcpush y ✄
x cache-btcpush y
(as R7)
R9 : x cache-btcpush cache-btc y ✄ x cache-btcpush y
(as R7, and “push” effect passes through the cache-
btc)
R10 : x cache-btc cache-btcpush y ✄ x cache-btcpush y
(as R7, and “push” effects are only downstream)
R11 : x cache-btcpush cache-plain y ✄
x cache-btcpush proxy-plain y
(“push” protocol disables downstream non-BTC
caches)
R12 : x proxy-scrubber cache-btc y ✄
x proxy-scrubber cache-plain y
(no tokens reach the cache-btc, therefore it defaults to
acting like a regular cache)
R13 : x proxy-scrubber cache-btcpush y ✄
x proxy-scrubber cache-plain y
(as R12)
R14 : x cache-plain cache-btc y ✄ x cache-btc y
(a BTC cache is unaffected by inconsistency intro-
duced by the upstream cache-plain; if it receives to-
kens, it acts like a correct BTC cache, otherwise it be-
haves like a cache-plain.)
R15 : x cache-plain cache-btcpush y ✄ x cache-btcpush y
(as R14)
R16 : server-plain cache-btc x ✄
server-plain cache-plain x
(a plain server provides no BTC annotations, so
cache-btc reverts to cache-plain behavior)
R17 : server-plain cache-btcpush x ✄
server-plain cache-plain x
(as R16)
R18 : server-btc cache-btc x ✄ server-btc x
(trivially follows from the correctness of BTC)
R19 : x cache-btcpush client ✄ x cache-btc client
(no agents separate the cache-btcpush from the client,
so its “push” component has no effect)
R20 : server-btc proxy-scrubber x ✄ server-plain x
(an immediately-scrubbed BTC server is indistin-
guishable from a plain server)
B.2 Proof of Closure under Reductions
Lemma B.1. The union of the patterns given in Theorem
4.5 correctly identify all members of A⊥ ∩ Atrue.
Proof. The “brute-force” proof of this lemma is triv-
ial, as A22 has two members: server-plain client
and server-plain cache-plain client. Among these,
server-plain client matches the first pattern which should
place it within Atrue; this agrees with a trivial analysis
(there are no caches to introduce inconsistencies in either).
Similarly, server-plain cache-plain client does not match
any patterns, identifying it as a member of A false; this
agrees with a trivial analysis (there is nothing to prevent
the cache-plain agent from introducing inconsistencies, as
“plain” caches are able to do by their nature). So the pattern
has correctly partitioned A⊥.
Lemma B.2. The set defined by the union of the three pat-
terns given in Theorem 4.5 is closed under all equivalence
rules; i.e., for all fi and f−1i corresponding with valid Ri,
it is true for all a ∈ A that π(a) = π(f ∗i (a)) and that
π(a) = π(f−1(∗)i )(a).
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Proof. For each of the 22 reductions R1 through R22, we
examine its meaning with respect to members of each of
the three success patterns stated in Theorem 4.5 (re-stated
in Table 3.
The 22 reductions are stated below as equivalences, with
discussions of their effects (both as reductions and as pro-
ductions) upon each of the three success patterns. “Does
not apply” indicates that neither side of the equivalence cor-
responds with members of the pattern, which implies that
the equivalence preserves non-membership.
R1 : x proxy-plain y = x y
1 Effected proxy-plain would appear in/be re-
moved from (proxy-scrubber | proxy-plain)∗
sub-pattern; no effect upon match.
2 Effected proxy-plain would appear
in/be removed from P ∗clean term and
(proxy-plain | proxy-scrubber)∗ sub-pattern; no
effect upon match.
3 Effected proxy-plain would appear in/be re-
moved from P ∗clean and P∗ terms; no effect upon
match.
Thus, R1 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R2 : x cache-plain cache-plain y = x cache-plain y
1 Does not apply.
2 Effected cache-plain would appear in/be re-
moved from P ∗clean term; no effect upon match.
3 As under R1.
Thus, R2 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R3 : x proxy-scrubber proxy-scrubber y =
x proxy-scrubber y
1 As under R1.
2 Effected proxy-scrubber would appear in/be re-
moved from (proxy-plain | proxy-scrubber)∗
sub-pattern; no effect upon match.
3 Effected proxy-scrubber would appear in/be re-
moved from P ∗ term; no effect upon match.
Thus, R3 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R4 : x proxy-scrubber cache-plain y =
x cache-plain proxy-scrubber y
1,2 Does not apply.
3 As under R3.
Thus, R4 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R5 : server-plain proxy-scrubber x = server-plain x
1 Effected proxy-scrubber would appear in/be re-
moved from (proxy-scrubber | proxy-plain)∗
sub-pattern; no effect upon match.
2,3 Does not apply.
Thus, R5 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R6 : x proxy-scrubber client = x client
1,2 As under R5.
3 Effected proxy-scrubber would appear in/be re-
moved from P ∗ term; no effect upon match.
Thus, R6 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R7 : x cache-btc cache-btc y = x cache-btc y
1 Does not apply.
2 Effected cache-btc would appear in/be removed
from P∗clean term; no effect upon match.
3 Effected cache-btc would appear in/be removed
from P∗clean and P∗ terms; no effect upon match.
Thus, R7 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R8 : x cache-btcpush cache-btcpush y =
x cache-btcpush y
1 Does not apply.
2,3 As under R7, but for cache-btcpush.
Thus, R8 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R9 : x cache-btcpush cache-btc y = x cache-btcpush y
1 Does not apply.
2,3 As under R7.
Thus, R9 and its inverse both preserve membership in
Atrue.
R10 : x cache-btc cache-btcpush y = x cache-btcpush y
1 Does not apply.
2,3 As under R8.
Thus, R10 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R11 : x cache-btcpush cache-plain y =
x cache-btcpush proxy-plain y
1 Does not apply.
2 Effected cache-plain or proxy-plain would be
substituted within P∗clean term; no effect upon
match.
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3 Effected cache-btc or proxy-plain would be sub-
stituted withinP∗clean orP∗ terms; no effect upon
match.
Thus, R11 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R12 : x proxy-scrubber cache-btc y =
x proxy-scrubber cache-plain y
1,2 Does not apply.
3 Effected cache-btc or cache-plain would be sub-
stituted within P∗ term; no effect upon match.
Thus, R12 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R13 : x proxy-scrubber cache-btcpush y =
x proxy-scrubber cache-plain y
1,2 Does not apply.
3 As under R12, but for cache-btcpush or
cache-plain.
Thus, R13 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R14 : x cache-plain cache-btc y = x cache-btc y
1 Does not apply.
2 Effected cache-plain would appear in/be re-
moved from P ∗clean term; no effect upon match.
3 Effected cache-plain would appear in/be re-
moved from P ∗clean or P∗ terms; no effect upon
match.
Thus, R14 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R15 : x cache-plain cache-btcpush y =
x cache-btcpush y
1 Does not apply.
2,3 As under R14, but for cache-btcpush.
Thus, R15 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R16 : server-plain cache-btc x =
server-plain cache-plain x
1,2,3 Does not apply.
Thus, R16 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R17 : server-plain cache-btcpush x =
server-plain cache-plain x
1,2,3 Does not apply.
Thus, R17 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R18 : server-btc cache-btc x = server-btc x
1 Reduction does not apply; production results in
an arrangement matching pattern 2.
2 For reduction, effected cache-btc may be re-
moved from P ∗clean (no effect upon match), or
could be the explicit cache-btc in which case the
result is an arrangement matching pattern 1. For
production, the effected cache-btc would appear
in P∗clean (no effect upon match).
3 Effected cache-btc would appear in/be removed
from P∗clean term; no effect upon match
Thus, R18 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R19 : x cache-btcpush client = x cache-btc client
1 Does not apply
2 Left-to-right production does not apply; right-to-
left production results in an arrangement match-
ing pattern 3
3 Left-to-right production results in an arrange-
ment matching pattern 2; for right-to-left pro-
duction, effected cache-btc and cache-btcpush
would be substituted within P ∗ term (no effect
upon match).
Thus, R19 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R20 : server-btc proxy-scrubber x = server-plain x
1 Effected proxy-scrubber would appear in/be re-
moved from (proxy-scrubber | proxy-plain)∗
sub-pattern; no effect upon match.
2,3 Does not apply.
Thus, R20 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R21 : server-btc client = server-plain client
1 Both sides of this rewrite match this pattern.
2,3 Does not apply.
Thus, R21 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
R22 : server-btc cache-plain client =
server-plain cache-plain client
1,2,3 Does not apply.
Thus, R22 and its inverse both preserve membership
in Atrue.
Thus, the sets Afalse and Atrue are each closed under the
reductions R1 through R22.
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